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ON THE CONFLATION OF THE STATE SECRETS
PRIVILEGE AND THE TOTTEN DOCTRINE
D. A. Jeremy Telman*
I. Introduction
In Intolerable Abuses, an article recently published in the Alabama Law Review,1 I criticized the
Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc.,2 in which the court dismissed,
before defendant had answered the complaint, plaintiffs’ claims alleging that Jeppesen Dataplan had assisted
in an illegal government program of extraordinary rendition and torture. Five judges purportedly
based their dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims on the state secrets privilege (SSP) alone, while the fifth
and deciding vote urged dismissal based on both the SSP and the Totten doctrine.3 Intolerable Abuses
argues that both the majority and the lone concurring judge erred because their analyses conflated
the SSP and the Totten doctrine. They thus imported reasoning appropriate to assessing claims
brought by parties that had entered into voluntary agreements with the government (or its contractors) into a case involving torts claims.
In his Response,4 Major Robert Barnsby likens the objections to the Jeppesen Dataplan decision
raised in Intolerable Abuses to “a baseball team asking for a highly qualified umpire to stand behind
home plate, then arguing that the umpire is not doing his job when he calls a strike on that team.”5
The problem with the analogy is that, because Jeppesen Dataplan was decided on a pre-Answer motion to dismiss, the “umpires” in Jeppesen Dataplan could not call a strike because the players had yet
Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. The Author
thanks Christina Phillips for her research assistance on this project.
1 D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 429 (2012)
[hereinafter Intolerable Abuses].
2 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.CT. 2442 (2011).
3 In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), the administrator of the estate of William A. Lloyd brought suit
to enforce an espionage contract allegedly entered into between Mr. Lloyd and President Lincoln. Intolerable Abuses,
supra note 1, at 440. The Totten doctrine precludes any suit to enforce a secret agreement with the government, or a
secret promise by the government. Such claims are non-justiciable. See id. at 441-42 (summarizing Totten’s holding and
reasoning).
4 Robert E. Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 667 (2012)
[hereinafter Response].
5 Id. at 668.
*
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to take the field. If the baseball analogy is to serve, then what happened in Jeppesen Dataplan is more
akin to umpires declaring the winner of the World Series on opening day, before the first pitch is
thrown. The Ninth Circuit “umpires” acknowledged that they did not and could not know which
team was superior. They ruled that the entire season must be called because proceeding would
endanger national security in ways that the “umpires” were not at liberty to specify or to share with
interested parties. We would not accept such an outcome in baseball, and we certainly should not
accept it in the federal court system.6
This brief Reply to Major Barnsby’s Response highlights the ways in which that Response typifies
the government’s conflation of the SSP with Totten so as to transform it from an evidentiary privilege into a broad doctrine of immunity applied in favor of the federal government and its contractors after ex parte proceedings. Major Barnsby contends that “the government should continue to be
allowed to use the SSP to put an end to litigation that might expose national security information,”
and he writes as if pre-discovery dismissal of a case is the “entire purpose”7 of the SSP. That characterization of the SSP indicates a fundamental confusion about the nature of the doctrine. The Response’s mischaracterization of the SSP derives from a conflation of the SSP, an evidentiary privilege,
with the Totten doctrine, which provides that suits to enforce secret agreements with the government
are non-justiciable.8
The Reply proceeds in three sections. First, the Reply quickly corrects three mischaracterizations
of Intolerable Abuses. Next, with reference to the recent Fazaga case,9 the Reply illustrates the continuing impact of Jeppesen Dataplan on SSP litigation, especially because it encourages courts to treat the
Totten doctrine as an element of the SSP. Finally, the Reply addresses the Response’s claim that Intolerable Abuses constitutes an overreaction to the problems raised by the SSP.
II. Three Mischaracterizations of Intolerable Abuses
Those who support the use of the SSP to dismiss cases before discovery often characterize such
cases as forcing judges to choose between national security and civil liberties.10 But Intolerable Abuses
maintains that the SSP almost never necessitates such a choice. Courts have ample means of pro6 The Response states that the SSP cannot be used lawfully to “defend criminal or willful conduct on behalf of the
government” and that it was not so used in Jeppesen Dataplan. Id. at 687-88. This is incorrect. The SSP is an absolute bar
and operates to exclude evidence or end litigation regardless of the nature of the claim. United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953).
7 See Response, supra note 4, at 669, 678 (stating that “the entire purpose of the [SSP] is to put an end to litigation that
might expose national security information”).
8 See Totten, 92 U.S. at 106-07 (dismissing claims on behalf of an alleged Civil War spy who had alleged a contractual
agreement with President Lincoln).
9 Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Case No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx) (C.D. Ca. Aug. 14, 2012), slip op. at 13
(citations to Jeppesen Dataplan omitted).
10 See, e.g., Response, supra note 4, passim (contending that some cases create an “irreconcilable conflict” between
national security and civil liberties, which courts must settle in favor of national security); Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at
1073 (observing that “there are times when exceptional circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between” liberty,
judicial transparency, and national security).
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tecting civil liberties without disclosing national security information. They do so in the criminal
context through the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),11 and they used to do so in the
civil context by allowing cases to proceed without the introduction of information subject to the
SSP. Decisions such as Jeppesen Dataplan undermine our government’s commitment to civil liberties without providing any national security benefit that could not be achieved through less onerous
means.
A. Intolerable Abuses Does Not Advocate the Disclosure of National Security Information
The Response notes that, once sensitive information is “released through the litigation process
(even as early as the discovery stage), that critical bell cannot be un-rung.”12 That is certainly true,
but since Intolerable Abuses does not advocate the release of sensitive information,13 the argument is
not relevant. The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as being hostile to all government’s assertions of the SSP. It is not. The government should assert the SSP whenever necessary to prevent
the disclosure of national security secrets. However, the consequence of a successful assertion of
the SSP is not an end to the litigation; the litigation simply proceeds without the privileged evidence.14
The Response attempts to illustrate the dangers of releases of sensitive information through a
discussion of alleged leaks of vital information during the prosecution of those responsible for the
World Trade Center Bombing of 1993.15 However, that example is inapposite, as those leaks were
the product of a decision by government attorneys to release classified information in a criminal
proceeding.16 If anything, the Response’s example supports the argument in Intolerable Abuses that the
political branches are the source of almost all national security leaks and that the Executive Branch’s
mistrust of courts as incapable of protecting secrets is ill-founded.17
B. Intolerable Abuses Does Not Call for Judgment for Plaintiffs Each Time the SSP Is Invoked
The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as advocating “automatic judgment for the plaintiff
if the government invokes the privilege, as a way of socializing the costs to the government of as11 Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96−456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
app. 3, §§ 1-16 (2006)).
12 Response, supra note 4, at 674.
13 See Intolerable Abuses, (“[N]othing here proposed would entail any public disclosure of state secrets unless the
government chose to do so.”).
14 See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (observing that when the SSP is successfully asserted, the
“result is simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly,
with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the evidence”) (quoting McCormick’s Handbook Of The
Law Of Evidence 233 (1972)).
15 See Response, supra note 4, at 684-85.
16 Response, supra note 4, at 685 (citing James Taranto, Two Decades of Pursuing al Qaeda, Wall St. J., Sept 10, 2011, at
A13).
17 See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 497 (noting the lack of evidence showing courts to be the source of national
security leaks).
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serting the privilege.”18 The Response calls this position “ridiculous”19 and it certainly is. The closest Intolerable Abuses comes to making any such argument is to advocate that the SSP operate like
any other evidentiary privilege and not as both a sword and a shield for the government.20 In the
rare cases when the SSP is found to prevent plaintiffs from being able to establish a prima facie case,
courts may dismiss cases on SSP grounds. On the other hand, in the even rarer cases where the SSP
is found to prevent the government or its contractors from establishing their affirmative defenses, a
court may have no alternative but to order judgment for the plaintiffs.
There likely would be almost no cases that would yield the latter result because, with the government’s cooperation, courts can almost always find a way for litigation to proceed without endangering national security secrets. If the government had to choose between losing on summary judgment and working with courts and plaintiffs’ attorneys to allow litigation to proceed while protecting
against the disclosure of national security secrets, the government would have less incentive to seek
an end to litigation through the SSP. The Response’s representation of an argument that would apply
to almost no cases as one that would apply to all cases in which the government asserts the SSP is
a product of its conflation of the SSP and Totten. The Response treats pre-discovery dismissal as the
natural outcome of an assertion of the SSP.21 But that is not how evidentiary privileges operate.
C. The Problem of Overclassification
Intolerable Abuses reports on the widespread consensus that overclassification is a problem and
discusses the current classification system, which creates incentives for overclassification and does
not penalize overclassification.22 The Response attempts a partial defense of government classification
policies. The Response contends that it is “administratively burdensome” to have too many classified
documents23 and so that is one consideration that prevents overclassification. In addition, Major
Barnsby notes that he is unaware of any intentional overclassification.24
Intolerable Abuses never contends that the problem of overclassification is the product of people
intentionally classifying materials that they know should not be classified. Overclassification occurs
despite the best intentions and good faith of those with the authority to classify. The problem is
that the incentives are set up so that, when in doubt, people classify, as former CIA Director Porter
Goss and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and countless others have acknowledged.25
18 Response, supra note 4 at 680.
19 Id.
20 Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 487-94 (“If the SSP deprives plaintiffs of information necessary to their claim, the
court may have to dismiss the complaint; although for reasons discussed below, that extreme remedy should rarely be
necessary.”).
21 See Response, supra note 4 at 678 (“[T]he entire purpose of the [SSP] is to put an end to litigation that might expose
national security information. . . .”).
22 Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 442-46.
23 Response, supra note 4 at 682-83.
24 Id. at 682
25 See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 443 (citing comments by then Congressmen Goss and Rumsfeld on the
problem of overclassification).
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In contending that “those in the field . . . distinctly do not have an incentive to overclassify,”26 the
Response references a recent report by the Brennan Center for Justice.27 That report itself identifies
the same problems with incentives that encourage overclassification highlighted in Intolerable Abuses.28
III. Jeppesen Dataplan’s Legacy: Conflation of Totten and the SSP in Fazaga v. F.B.I.
Although the Response characterizes the result in Jeppesen Dataplan as the product of a court reaching the same conclusion via two separate doctrines,29 its conclusions are entirely the product of the
erroneous conflation of Totten, a contracts doctrine, with the SSP. This is necessarily so because the
SSP, properly understood as an evidentiary privilege, could never result in the pre-discovery dismissal of a case. Before a court knows what evidence will be relevant to the parties’ legal positions,
it cannnot determine whether or not a case can proceed without privileged evidence.
The purpose of evidentiary privileges such as the SSP is not to end litigation but to permit it
to continue without the information subject to the privilege. In cases in which it is difficult for the
litigation to proceed, courts may avail themselves of in camera proceedings conducted by securitycleared counsel – or even of ex parte proceedings – in order to prevent the disclsoure of secret information. The record of such in camera proceedings can be sealed.30
The Reynolds case31 on which the Response relies,32 recognized the SSP as an evidentiary privilege,
which may excuse the government from certain discovery obligations,33 but the question of whether
the SSP can be grounds for dismissal was never raised in Reynolds.34 The Response reads as if some
Supreme Court precedent guided the Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen Dataplan and left it no choice but to
dismiss the case before an Answer had been filed.35 The Supreme Court has never weighed in on
whether the SSP can be a basis for dismissal, and it has never addressed the question of whether the
SSP can apply before discovery has begun.
26 Response, supra note 4 at 683.
27 Id. at 682-83 (citing Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reducing Overclassification
Through Accountability (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3cb5dc88d210b8558b_38m6b0ag0.pdf).
28 See Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountibility,
21-38 (2011) (discussing both incentives for overclassification and the lack of incentives to refrain from or challenge
overclassification).
29 Response, supra note 4 at 677-78.
30 See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 494-97 (detailing court-implemented alternatives to dismissal that permitted
litigation to proceed without disclosure of classified information); see also D. A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged
Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 Temple L. Rev. 499, 518-22 (2007).
31 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
32 See Response, supra note 4 at 670-71 (characterizing Reynolds as precedent that has not been disturbed in nearly sixty
years).
33 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12 (holding that the United States was excused from its obligation to produce an official
accident investigation report on the ground that it contained information relating to electronic equipment aboard a
military aircraft that crashed).
34 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
35 See Response, supra note 4 at 688 (arguing that “courts should continue to follow well-established Supreme Court
precedent” dismissing cases based on the SSP).

6

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 3, No. 1

It should go without saying that evidentiary privileges have to do with evidence. As articulated
in Reynolds, the SSP comes into play when a party seeks discovery from the government or from
some other entity in possession of national security information.36 If the SSP is successfully invoked, and if there is no way for it to be introduced in camera, it may prevent the plaintiff from making out a prima facie case. In such cases, the court must dismiss the complaint. However, in Jeppesen
Dataplan, plaintiffs made no discovery requests.37 The case was dismissed before they could do so
and before Jeppesen Dataplan could articulate its defenses.38
The Response credits the Ninth Circuit for its “searching inquiry into the underlying evidence,”39
but what was the nature of that inquiry? The government submitted classified affidavits through
which it claimed that there was no way for the case to proceed without the release of information
subject to the SSP. Such a claim makes no sense when the defendant has yet to articulate its legal
theories and when no discovery has been sought.
Moreover, both the Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen Dataplan and the Central District of California in
Fazaga were explicit in their conflation of the doctrines. As the Ninth Circuit explains it, the “contemporary state secrets privilege” encompasses two applications of the principle that courts may
sometimes have to dismiss cases in order to prevent disclosure of state secrets: “One completely
bars adjudication of claims premised on state secrets (the ‘Totten bar’); the other is an evidentiary
privilege (the ‘Reynolds privilege’) that excludes privileged evidence from the case and may result in
dismissal of the claims.”40 The Central District decision goes further still in blurring any distinction
between the two doctrines:
There are two modern applications of the state secrets doctrine: (1) a justiciabilty bar that forecloses
litigation altogether because the very subject matter of the case is a state secret (the “Totten bar”) and
(2) an evidentiary privilege that excludes certain evidence because it implicates secret information
and may result in dismissal of claims (the “Reynolds privilege”). . . . While distinct, the Totten bar and
the Reynolds privilege converge in situations where the government invokes the privilege – as it may
properly do – before waiting for an evidentiary dispute to arise during discovery or trial.41

Thus, in small steps, the courts transform an evidentiary privilege into a doctrine that can lead to
pre-discovery dismissal.
There are numerous errors in reasoning along the way. The Jeppesen Dataplan court errs by folding the Totten doctrine into the “contemporary state secrets privilege.” It is nothing of the sort. It
is not a privilege, and (thus far) it only has been applied in a handful of cases brought by people
who entered into voluntary agreements with the government. But even if courts do not dismiss
36 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11.
37 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076 (2010).
38 Id. at 1076-77.
39 Response, supra note 4 at 675.
40 Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1077 (emphasis in original).
41 Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Case No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx) (C.D. Ca. Aug. 14, 2012), slip op. at
13 (citations to Jeppesen Dataplan omitted).
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torts cases based on Totten, Totten has infected their understanding of the SSP. Reynolds did concede
that the SSP could in some cases require dismissal of a case, but that is no different from having to
dismiss a prosecution because a key witness has died. Reynolds did not conceive of the SSP as necessitating pre-discovery dismissal, and that result cannot be squared with the evidentiary nature of the
privilege that the Court recognized in Reynolds.
With the Jeppesen Dataplan opinion as its guide, the Fazaga court stumbles into erroneous conclusions, blithely stating that the Totten doctine is part of the SSP and that the “Reynolds privilege” can
result in pre-discovery dismissal.42 Both of these statements are doctrinally incoherent. A justiciability doctrine is not a component of an evidentiary privilege, and an evidentiary privilege cannot
provide a basis for dismissal before any evidence has been sought or introduced.
IV. Intolerable Abuses Does Not Overstate the Significance of the SSP
A. Is the SSP a Serious Problem?
The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as an overreaction to the government’s use of the
SSP to end litigation in select cases.43 The Response suggests that because the SSP is seldom invoked
and only after the Department of Justice’s “onerous requirements” have been satisfied,44 it is not
subject to abuse. But the Response ignores Laura Donohue’s scholarship,45 which details the enormous impact of the assertion of the SSP (or the threatened assertion of the SSP) not only in published opinions but also at earlier stages of litigation. Donohue summarizes the impact of the SSP
as follows:
It has been used to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, creating a form of
private indemnity for government contractors in a broad range of areas. Patent law, contracts, trade
secrets, employment law, environmental law, and other substantive legal areas have similarly been
affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and unanticipated advantages over
opponents in the course of litigation.46

Clearly, the SSP has an impact well beyond that of high profile cases such as Jeppesen Dataplan. If
Intolerable Abuses is to be faulted, it should be on the ground that it, like other scholarship on the SSP
other than Donohue’s, focuses on the tip of the iceberg – on reported opinions – rather than on the
bulk of the fights over the SSP, which do not make their way into published opinions. If anything,
Intolerable Abuses understates the myriad ways in which the SSP undermines legal processes.
The Response also invokes the additional precautions that the Obama administration has taken to

42 Id.
43 See Response, supra note 4 at 678-681 (contending that Intolerable Abuses “exhibits an unmerited ‘sky is falling’
mentality”).
44 Id. at 679.
45 See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77 (2010).
46 Id. at 91.
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prevent abuses of the SSP.47 This is cold comfort. Whatever standards are put in place during one
administration can be abandoned by the next. In any case, despite the Obama administration’s laudable efforts to curb use of the SSP, its invocation has already effected great harms to our constitutional order because it has prevented the judiciary from serving its constitutional purpose. Given an
actual case or controversy, it is the province and duty of the courts to say what the law is. Because
of the SSP, we do not know what the law is with respect to a whole range of highly questionable
policies associated with the War on Terror. That uncertainty sows distrust of government actors
(and their contractors) and cynicism at home, and it harms the reputation of the United States as
a member of the community of nations. Moreover, as Jeppesen Dataplan and Fazaga demonstrate,
despite the Holder Memo, the government continues to use the SSP to seek pre-discovery dismissal
of cases, which is never appropriate.
V. Conclusion
My argument is simple. The government should invoke the SSP whenever necessary to prevent
disclosure of information that might jeopardize national security. Courts should carefully review assertions of the SSP and work with government attorneys and plaintiffs’ attorneys, who may include
court-appointed, security-cleared counsel, to find a way for litigation to proceed without the disclosure of privileged information. The Totten doctrine can never apply to plaintiffs whose interaction with our government or its contractors was involuntary, and an evidentiary privilege can never
provide a basis for pre-discovery dismissal of claims.

47 See Response, supra note 4 at 679 (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts
& Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) available at http:/www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf).

On the Conflation of the State Secrets Privilege and the Totten Doctrine

9

